Social Embeddedness in Stakeholder Networks and Legislators’ Policy Preferences: The Case of German Livestock Policy by Grunenberg, Michael & Henning, Christian H.C.A.
The Agricultural Working Paper Series is published by the
Chair of Agricultural Policy at the University of Kiel.
The authors take the full responsibility for the content.
Michael Grunenberg
Christian H.C.A. Henning
Insitute for Agriculture Economics
Kiel University
Social Embeddedness in Stakeholder Networks and
Legislators’ Policy Preferences:
The Case of German Livestock Policy
AGRICULTURAL POLICY
WORKING PAPER SERIES
WP 2019-06
ISSN: 2366-7109
W
OR
KI
NG
PA
PE
RS
OF
AG
RI
CU
LT
UR
AL
PO
LI
CY
Michael Grunenberg
Christian H.C.A. Henning
Social Embeddedness in Stakeholder Networks and Legislators’ Policy Preferences:
The Case of German Livestock Policy
Insitute for Agriculture Economics
Kiel University
Kiel, 2019
WP 2019-06
http://www.agrarpol.uni-kiel.de/de/publikationen/working-papers-of-agricultural-policy
About the authors:
Michael Grunenberg is research assistant and doctoral candidate at the departement for
agricultural policy at Insitute for Agricultural Economics of Kiel.
Christian H.C.A. Henning is professor and chair of the departement for agricultural
policy at Insitute for Agricultural Economics of Kiel.
Corresponding author: mgrunenberg@ae.uni-kiel.de
Abstract
In a world of increasing complexity, politicians have only limited information
about the relationship of policies and the outcomes. They often make use of
simplified heuristics, i.e. policy beliefs. Hence, an influence opportunity for in-
terest groups occurs: informational lobbying. It complements classic lobbying
strategies, e.g. vote buying or campaign spending. Providing expert knowledge
allows interest groups to influence legislators towards the preferred policy posi-
tion. Aside from so-called "approved votes", German parliamentarians generally
follow parliamentary group’s discipline. Thus, experts’ role within parliamentary
groups is crucial. They deal with key issues and represent the parliamentary
group in the committees. Furthermore, they work out the group’s positions on
these specific issues. They are the starting point for interest groups to dissemi-
nate their information and hence influence the legislators’ positions.
An exemplary field of complexity is the agricultural sector. In particular, live-
stock production is challenged by questions of sustainability, i.e. public expec-
tations towards animal welfare, producers and consumers’ welfare as well as
ecological consequences. Importance of animal welfare is demonstrated by the
ongoing debate about piglet castration or husbandry system standards. This
raises two questions: First, to what extend are stakeholders able to gain direct
access to politicians? Second, how can they use this structure to influence policy
decisions? Using a social network approach, we first investigate the structure of
three networks: exchange of expert knowledge, political support and informal
social ties. In particular, we put emphasis on the connection between parliamen-
tary actors and other stakeholders from society, i.e. interest groups. This refers
to the first question. Second, we apply a model of political exchange using infor-
mation and lobbying networks. Following Henning et al. (2019), this model not
only includes political exchange, but also belief updating. Moreover, it considers
direct as well as indirect ties. This analysis step serves to answer the second
question.
1 Introduction
In a world of increasing complexity, politicians have only limited information about the
relationship of policies and the outcomes. Hence, they use simple mental models about
the outcomes of certain policies. These heuristics are named as policy beliefs1 (Henning
and Hedtrich, 2018).
1If beliefs are biased (Akerlof, 1989) and thus differ from the correct political technology, they might
cause political failure (Caplan, 2001, 2007).
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As argued by Henning et al. (2019), this offers an influence opportunity for interest
groups which is labelled as informational lobbying: While classical lobbying mechanisms
refer to vote buying or campaign spending, expert knowledge provision influences legis-
lators’ policy beliefs. Accordingly, in general stakeholder organizations more and more
serve in political advisory committees in Germany (Hustedt et al., 2010). Beside this ad-
visory committees, the important role of (informal) policy networks can not be neglected
for several policy domains like for example labour and social policy (Pappi et al., 1995),
European CAP (Pappi and Henning, 1999; Henning, 2009), development policies (Stark,
2017; Henning and Krampe, 2018; Henning et al., 2019) or wind energy policy (Ratinen,
2019). Hence, interest groups are able to move legislators towards the preferred policy
position indirectly. Since they provide this knowledge and use it as influence resource (see
also Grossman and Helpman, 1996), governments benefit from it.
In general, German members of parliament follow parliamentary group’s discipline2.
Thus, the role of parliamentary group experts, i.e. specialist political spokesman, is cru-
cial. They deal with key issues and represent the parliamentary group in the committees.
Furthermore, they work out the group’s positions on these specific issues. Since the
specialization in one policy field is the starting point of a politician’s contact networks
(Schöne, 2014), he is the door opener for interest groups to disseminate their information
and hence influence the legislators’ positions.
Agricultural policy is a complex policy field. In particular, animal welfare plays a
key role (Cornish et al., 2016; European Court of Auditors, 2018; WBA, 2015) due to a
negative perception of current husbandry level (Kayser et al., 2011; Salamon et al., 2014).
This is especially true for pig husbandry (Zander et al., 2013; Rovers et al., 2017, 2018,
2019). At a conceptual level, animal welfare consists of three dimensions addressing not
only health and the opportunity for natural behaviour, but also the emotional state of an
animal (Fraser, 2008).
We see an increasing importance of stakeholder participation in livestock politics. The
national strategy for farm animal husbandry (BMEL, 2017) includes stakeholder partici-
pation and hence follows recommendations of WBA (2015). Hence, it is no surprise that
for example food retailers are not only empowered to act as regulators (Maciel and Bock,
2013), but state actors partly retire from steering (Vogeler, 2019). On the other hand,
civil society organizations (CSO) use campaigns to draw attention to the topic, to increase
the pressure and hence to promote increasing standards. This is not limited to animal
protection groups, which partly cooperate with the agribusiness sector to develop stan-
dards for labels like Deutscher Tierschutzbund (o.J.). For example, Greenpeace (2017)
states that pig husbandry standards in Germany are violating the German constitution as
well as the animal protection law. Accordingly, the organizations conducts campaigns and
protest actions (WELT.de, 2018) against current practice. Hence, two questions occur:
2Exception are so-called "approved votes".
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1. To what extend are (which) stakeholders able to gain direct access to politicians?
2. How can they use this structure to influence policy decisions?
To answer these questions, we follow the approach provided by Henning et al. (2019)
and quantify classical lobbying effects as well communicational lobbying structures in
German livestock policy. The following section briefly summarises a framework of both,
classical and communicational lobbying. Subsequently, we describe the data used for
analysis. Note that since we are interested in mapping the whole political landscape of
livestock policy, we include a network of social relation3. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. We end with an conclusion in section 5.
2 A Framework of Classical and Communicational
Lobbying
In order to quantify the influence of stakeholders, we apply a framework that a) com-
bines classical with informational lobbying and b) models the access structure between
interest groups and political actors as social networks (Henning et al., 2019). Here, clas-
sical lobbying refers to established approaches of lobbying where an interest group tries
to exchange resources of influence against votes for preferred positions (Grossman and
Helpman, 1996). This exchange takes place in political exchange networks (Pappi and
Henning, 1998; Henning, 2000, 2009). Let MS denote the n×n adjacency matrix and it’s
elementmSij = 1 the provision of political support by i to agent j. Given the corresponding
column stochastic adjacency matrix M¯S and political agents’ interest in support Xdiag,
we get
MˆS = [I − (sk)diag[I − (1 − sk)diagM¯S]−1M¯SXdiag]−1 (1)
as network multiplier matrix. Here mˆsij corresponds the power outflow from j to i. The
broker share sk integrates direct and indirect power flows, i.e. takes indirect connections
into account (Henning, 2009; Henning et al., 2019).
Following (Henning et al., 2019), communicational (or informational) lobbying refers
to the provision of expert knowledge as influence mechanism. In particular, even expert
politicians seldom have all or sufficient information regarding their policy field. Accord-
ingly, legislators need additional information. Interest groups have sufficient knowledge
and seek to gain influence by strategically revealing it. Hence, they try to sway legisla-
tors toward the preferred policy4. Communicational lobbying influences the policy beliefs
3Of course, “social relation” normally refers to every kind of relation between social actors. For the
purpose of the paper, we use this term referring to informal social ties beside communication and
lobbying.
4Note, that this information not necessarily serve only self-interest. It may also be objective expert
knowledge serving the welfare of whole society (Ball, 1995).
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determining actors’ policy positions. Policy beliefs are mental models regarding the po-
litical technology T (x, z, ), i.e. the relation between policy x and outcome z. In general,
a real political technology is complex. In order to reduce this complexity, laymen as well
as interest groups and political agents make use of their beliefs A˜. A˜ is the result of
communication learning process and the initial belief A˜0:
A˜ = Υ(A˜0) (2)
with Υ denoting the communication mechanism (Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). This
mechanism corresponds to communicational learning (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010).
MC is the n×n adjacency matrix of this communication network where element mcij > 0
corresponds to a communication tie, i.e. i sends information to j. Let M¯C denote the
row stochastic transpose of MC . Given own-control, i.e. the extent that an actors own
knowledge determines his beliefs, network multiplier matrix can be calculated:
MˆC = [I − (1 −mCdiagM¯C)]−1 ×mCdiag (3)
where mCdiag denotes own control and mˆij is the effect of j’s initial on i’s final belief. Please
note that this update procedure corresponds to the model of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990).
This model takes indirect influence into account.
All in all, policy positions depend on classical and communicational lobbying. The next
section describes the data used for model application.
3 Data
We use the data of an survey among German livestock policy stakeholder organizations.
In particular, we interviewed expert politicians from the six parliamentary groups of
the German national parliament as well as representatives of interest groups and public
administration. Before the interviews started, we stated that we were not interested in
the personal, but in the parliamentary group position. This also applies for the interest
groups and other actors that have been interviewed. Based on desk research we identified
more than 100 relevant stakeholder organizations. Because of time and resource limits
it was not possible to interview all of them. So after the first rounds of interviews, the
intermediate results of a reputation network have been used to filter out the unimportant
actors. Finally 37 interviews have been carried out. Note that since one organization did
not completed the interview, we have a data set of 36 actors. Average interview duration
was 1.5 hours.
Beside questions regarding animal welfare and husbandry policies, the questionnaire
used contains elite networks, where the representatives had to mark all organizations they
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perceive as important to livestock politics. This reputation network was used to set up
the network boundaries. Our networks of interest are the expert communication network
as well as the political support network and a network of social contacts. Please note that
we asked communication and political support network from two perspectives. Hence, we
got confirmed networks (see Pappi et al., 1995). For the communication Network MC ,
the interviewed representatives had to answer three questions:
QE1: “From whom do you receive expert information regarding livestock?”
QE2: “To whom do you send expert information regarding livestock?”
QE3: “Information of which organization are especially valuable?”
QE1 refers to the perspective as knowledge receiver from other actors. For whom the
organization serves as knowledge provider was content of QE2. Finally, the organization’s
representatives had to evaluate the marked organizations in QE1 with respect to the value
of information (QE3). This leads to a valued network. Thus, elements of MC can be one
of three values: If mCij = 0, there is no communication tie between actors i and j where
mCij = 1 indicates that i sends information to j. If mCij = 2, j perceives knowledge provided
by i as especially valuable.
Subsequently, we asked for the political support network from two perspectives:
QS1 “Which political actors do you support?”
QS2 “From which organizations do you receive political support?”
Since we take indirect support into account (equation 1), we allowed the interest groups
to mark other interest groups. Moreover, we allowed political agents to support other
political agents. Finally, if mSij = 1 i supports actor j.
In contrast to the communication and lobbying network, the network of social relations
is an undirected network. In particular, we asked interviewees to mark all organizations
to which they have relations beyond professional distance. We emphasized that usually
these ties establish over a long time period.
Results are given in the next section.
4 Results
The confirmed communication network has a density of 0.266, i.e. 26.6 percent of possible
ties are realised (figure 1). Parliamentary group of CDU and CSU as well as the federal
ministry of agriculture are the center of this network. Especially groups of the agribusiness
sector, i.e. food retailers, meat industry as well as agriculture and animal production, put
emphasis on ties to this core. As figure 1 indicates, animal and environment protection
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Figure 1: Communication Network
as well as ecological agriculture are knowledge provider to green and left party. Please
note also, that the AfD only receives information from two organizations. As indicated
by figure 2, agriculture and animal production organizations have the strongest effect
on FDP’s belief updating. Moreover, one can clearly see that meat sector’s influence
on this parliamentary group is the biggest when compared to influence on other groups.
For the CDU/CSU group the effect of all producer organizations equals a share of 0.252.
Interestingly, this is close to the producers influence on LINKE (0.251, figure 2). Belief
updating of the parliamentary group SPD is mostly driven by animal protection groups.
This also applies for the AfD group, where animal protection has a share of 0.359 (figure 2).
Additionally, their influence on the LINKE group corresponds 0.214. Hence, the effect of
animal protection organizations on AfD, SPD and LINKE is higher than for the green
parliamentary group (figure 2). When looking at the influence of parliamentary groups
on each other, one can easily see in figure 2 that the effect of CDU/CSU, LINKE and
FDP on the green beliefs is roughly the same.
With a value of 0.085, the density of the political support network is lower when com-
pared to communication. In particular, there are established support ties from agribusi-
ness towards CDU/CSU and FDP. On the other hand, green and left parliamentary groups
are supported by animal and environment protection organizations. Interestingly, AfD
group and two federal agencies are not part of the political support network. As figure 4
shows, due to the isolated position of AfD there is zero outflow from the parliamentary
group. Measurements of support multipliers also shows that animal and environment
protection groups mostly benefit from power outflow from the green group. Consumer
protection groups also gain a high share of power through supporting the green parlia-
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Figure 2: Communication Effect on Parliamentary Groups
mentary group (figure 4). Highest share of power outflow from CDU/CSU is assigned to
agribusiness, i.e. producers, meat sector, egg and milk production as well as food retailers.
Please note, that this parliamentary group is the main source of power for meat (to an
extend of 0.041, figure 4). Please note, that almost every power from the FDP flows out
to agriculture/animal production and food retailers.
With regard to the social relations beside political support and expert exchange, we
identify a density of 0.333 (figure 5). Again, we see a clear picture of “coalitions”: The
agribusiness sector established informal contacts to CDU/CSU and FDP. Moreover, there
are informal ties between green party and animal protection as well as environment pro-
tection and the left parliamentary group. The block model analysis identified four blocks.
Note that actors are assigned to the same block if they have similar social relation pat-
tern. Block 1 is a mixture of public agencies, agribusiness and consumer as well as animal
protection. Moreover, FDP is a member of this block (figure 6). The outsiders of the
network are assigned to this block. Hence this block is labelled as “mixed block”. As
figure 6 shows, block 2 consists of only four organizations. Beside the retailers animal
welfare initiative, agriculture and animal production form this block. In particular, the
national farmers association is part of this block. Hence we can label this block as the
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Figure 3: Political Support Network
“producing block”. Members of Block 3 are green and left parliamentary group as well as
several civic social organizations. Accordingly, “green block” is the appropriate label for
this block. The fourth block consists of CDU/CSU as well as food retail, meat, agriculture
and animal production actors. Hence, we name it “political agribusiness block”. If looking
at the block level, one can easily see, that there is a strong relation between block 2 and
block 4. Here, the density between both blocks is 0.59 (figure 7). This is not a surprise if
we look at the blocks contents: as mentioned above, block 2 is the producing block while
block 4 was labelled as political agribusiness block. The connection between producing
and the mixed block half that strong, since density between the blocks only corresponds
0.28 (figure 7). Furthermore, all actors of block 2 are connected with each other, i.e. the
block has a density value of 1. In block 4, almost 65 percent of possible relations between
block members are realised.
5 Conclusion
Results of the applied model show that the agricultural sector as well as animal protection
groups have the highest influence on beliefs within the stakeholder network. Strongest
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Figure 4: Power Outflows from Parliamentary Groups
influence of agriculture and animal production is the effect on FDP’s belief updating, while
the highest relative share of animal protection is assigned to the AfD parliamentary group.
The AfD parliamentary group is not part of the confirmed political support network and
hence relying to 100 percent on the own position. Most power outflows are observed
for social democrats, where especially food retailers and animal protection organizations
benefit from. Results for CDU/CSU and greens are not surprising. The mentioned
coalitions - CDU/CSU and agribusiness as well as green party and environment/animal
protection - are also confirmed in terms of informal social relations. At the same time, one
third of possible ties in this network are realised. The according block model identified
four blocks based on established ties. Interestingly, beside a political agribusiness block
including CDU/CSU, a small second producer block exists. The latter contains Germany’s
farmers association.
All in all, these results show that the parliamentary groups of CDU/CSU, but also FDP,
are mostly influenced by agribusiness. Stakeholder from this field not only dominate the
belief formation process, but also benefit the most from classical lobbying. Moreover,
these professional relations are extended in the informal social relation area. On the
other hand, animal and environment protection groups have the biggest influence on the
green parliamentary group. Accordingly, the informal contact patterns are almost the
same. If relating these findings to political science literature, the former fits to recent
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Figure 5: Informal Social Relation Network
results: While Vogeler (2017a,b) shows that governments including green parties promote
stronger animal protection laws, Ewert et al. (2018) identify multi-functionalism orien-
tation among German state governments with green participation. Hence, CDU/CSU
as well as FDP parliamentary group especially take into account productivity interests
of agribusiness. The green (and also the left) group mostly reflect positions or goals of
animal and environment protection organizations.
But to confirm this conclusion, more research is needed. The formation of all three
networks has to be investigated using (Bayesian) exponential random graph models. In
particular, these models should consider endogenous and exogenous variables.
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Figure 6: Informal Social Relation Network by Block Membership
Figure 7: Informal Social Relation Block Model
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